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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENr.I' OF FACTS 
Case 
No. 9400 
This appeal arises out of the probate proceedings in 
r:t'he l\latter of the Estate of Hillard L. Voorhees, de-
ceased, file number 2655 and the civil action entitled 
Betty Hayward and Beverly Clyde, plaintiffs, vs. Pearl 
0. Voorhees, defendant, file number 4784, both from the 
District Court of Sanpete County. 
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Parties before the court in this appeal are the ap-
pellant, Pearl 0. Voorhees, widow of Hillard L. Voorhees, 
deceased, and the respondents, Beverly Clyde and Betty 
Hayward, daughters of the appellant and the deceased. 
Reference made hereafter to the appellant, Mrs. Pearl 
0. Voorhees, shall be as ''Mother", and to the respondents, 
Betty Hayward and Beverly Clyde, as ''Daughters." 
Hanson Land and Livestock Company, which inter-
vened in probate 2655 only, is designated as "intervener" 
and shall be referred to hereinafter in that manner. In-
tervener comes into this action to protect its rights to 
purchase certain lands and grazing permits under an 
agreement entered into with the Mother in October of 
1958 (Tr. Sept. 15 55-56). 
Walker Bank and Trm5t Company is the admini-
strator of the Estate of Hillard L. Voorhees, deceased, 
but does not participate in this appeal. 
The dispute necessitating this appeal involves a claim 
by the Daughters that land and property deeded to the 
M~other in 1940 should be placed in trust and proteeterl 
for their ultimate use and benefit; and in support of this 
claim, they assert that the land and property belongs in 
the Estate of Hillard L. Voorhees, deceased, and there-
fore should be treated in the same manner as other Estate 
properties. The disputed property consists of the family 
home and farm situated near Manti, Utah, pasture and 
sheep land designated as the Mountain Ground and 
located in Sevier and Sanpete Counties, Taylor Grazing 
Permits, and personal property consisting, for the most 
., 
,) 
part, of furniture from the family home. This property 
r;hall be n·ferred to herein as the "separate property." 
The property jn Hillard L. Voorhees' name at the 
time of his death is listed in thP inventory and appraise-
ment filed in the probate proceedings of 1957, and will 
hereinafter he referred to as the "estate property." As 
to tlie estate property, ther0 ir-; no dispute. (Rl 2655 24) 
In 19+0, Hillard L. Voorhees, deceased, conveyed by 
der1l to his 1vife, Pearl 0. Voorhees, appellant, as grantee 
the separate property CF~xh. +, 5, 6, and 7: (Tr. Oct. 21 
92), Tn 1!)53, prior to taking a trip by automobile, Mr. 
arnl )J rs. Voorhees infornwd Betty Hayward, their 
<laughter, that the:T had executed instruments conveying 
tlie Peparate property to her and her sister (Tr. Oct. 21 
:19, 90). Jn 1956, prior to the death of Hillard L. Voor-
hees, the Mother causPd the deeds (Exh. 4, 5, 6, and 7) 
11aming her as grantee of the separate property to be 
rc>cordcd (Tr. Oct. 21 10.t). Fo Ho wing the death of 
Uillard L. Voorhees on .July 24, l 956, the petition of 
the llfother to be appointed administratrix was granted. 
'rhis is the background upon which the appeal is based. 
The proceedings presented for review commenced 
"With the hearing in the probate matter on October 21, 
1957, followed by the hearing in the civil action on April 
1, rn59 (the trarnscripts are designated 'l1r. Oct. 21 : Tr. 
Apr. 1 ). The next proceedings presented are the 
hearings of August 29, 1959 and September 15, 1959 
which were consolidated hearings of both cases (the 
trans<'.ripts will be designated Tr. Aug. 29 : Tr. Sept. 
4 
15 ) . Following these was the hearing on February 
1, 1960, entitled to probate nmuher 2655 (the transcript 
will be designated Tr. Feb. l ) . 
There were two hearings subsequent to the February 
l hearing which were entirely in the probate matter; 
they were apparently not reported because the transcripts 
were not filed by the derk. They were held on March 
14; 1960, relating to petition to distribute grazing per-
mits, and on December 5, 1960 relating to motions for a 
new trial. It is impossible to differentiate the civil from 
the probate in the consolidated hearings or which pro-
ceedings and what evidence the court eonsidered in its 
judgment of October 2, 1959. It is equally impossible to 
determine which proceedings, and what testimony and 
documents the court considered in entering its decrees 
of distribution. Two decrees in probate 2655, both dated 
October 13, 1960, were entered; one relating to real 
property and one to grazing rights. Reference to the 
decrees of distribution will be as one unless specifically 
identified. For the reasons stated, the circumstances 
presented by this appeal are set forth in four stages: 
First, the testimony and documentary evidence in 
the probate proceedings from the appointment of the 
Mother as administratrix to July 17, 1958, the date of 
filing the complaint in the civil action. 
Second, the pleadings and the memorandum of under-
standing filed in civil action 4 784 and the hearing on 
April 1, 1959. 
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'l'hird, the hearings of August 26, and September 15, 
195!1. "·herein the probate and eivil matters were con-
solidated and heard jointly . 
. F'ourth, the hearing on February 1, 1960 and the 
fffO<'Pedings subsequent to that date wherein the decrees 
of distribution \Vere made by the court. 
rrhe first stage deals with the administration of the 
estatP h.v the Mother and the proceedings to remove her 
from that position. Immediately following the death of 
hPr It us hand, the Mother discussed the property with 
thP Daughters and Betty assisted her in the duties rela 
ting to the property by keeping accounts of expenditures 
and other details. This required frequent discussion of 
the estate matters, including the sales of the estate pro-
pert~' and the .Mother's use of the separate property 
(Hl 2655 233-236). These discussions ultimately turned 
to the problem of the final disposition of the separate 
prop(~ rt~'· One of the Da nghters (Beverly Clyde) had 
song-lit legal advice as to the best method of managing 
the Pstate and separate property, and as a result in-
formed the l\f other of the desirable features of a trust 
naming them beneficiaries. These discussions culminated 
in a consultation with \Valker Bank & Trust Go. and the 
preparation of a trust agreement (Dep. Feb. 5 34). 
'l'he (_•fforts were of no avail, however, because the trust 
agreemeut prepared did not contain a provision making 
the transfer of the property to the trust irrevocable. The 
l\fother's retention of any rights in her property after 
transfer to the trust, except a stated income, was un-
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arreptahh• to the Daughters (Tr. Sept. 15 72: 
Dep. Feh. 5 :14). 11he failure of the trust agreement 
ehanp;e<l the nature of things; the Daughters ref erred 
thP matter to connsel, who filed the petition to revoke 
the Mother's letters of administration and to compel 
delivery of the estate property they alleged was wrong-
full~" withheld (R.1 2655 29,30). 
A hearing on the petition was held in Manti on 
October 2L 1957, at which time the Mother appeared and 
testified. She stated that the deeds (Exh. 4, 5, 6, and 7) 
were executed by her husband in 1940 (Tr. Oct 21 
56), were given to her that day or the day following their 
execution (Tr. Oet. 21 96-97), ~were retained by her 
in a steel box where she kept her other papers (Tr. 
Oct. 21 97-98), and that she took the deeds from the 
box in .June of 1956 and recorded them when it became 
apparent that Mr. Voorhees was near death (Exh. 4, 5, 
6, and 7: Tr. Oct. 21 104). She also testified that 
the deeds to her Daughters were signed by both her and 
her husband but were retained in his safe until after his 
death when they were destroyed (Tr. Oct. 21 91). 
No order or judgment was entered by the court except to 
permit the Mother to withdraw as administratrix (Rl 
2655 Minute Entry Oct. 21, 1959). 
The second stage covers the events relating to the 
civil action against the Mother and the circumstances 
leading to the judgment of Oct. 2, 1959. The Daughters 
filed their complaint on July 17, 1958 alleging that tile 
to the separate property was in Hillard Voorhees at the 
tirn0 of his death and was rightfully property of the 
Ij~state an( l asked for punitive damages for the wrongful 
"·ithholding (R 4784 1 ). The Mother denied the 
allegations of the complaint and the case was set for 
trial April 1, 1959. On that date counsel for the parties 
drafted the memorandum of understanding. The court 
was advisecl that such a document had heen signed by the 
partiP:-: and the~· requested the matter be rontinued with-
out date to give> an opportnnit~; to reach agreement. The 
memorandum of understanding was not filed with the 
court a11d it >Yas stat('d that if the efforts failed, either 
party <·onld rall the case for trial (Tr. Apr. 1 1,2). 
H w;u; in Ortoher, 1958 that the l\fother entered into the 
agr0Prnent with the intrrvener (Exh. 3: Rl 2655 
2:)3, ~36). In thP text of this agreement, the parties 
r0cognized that the title to tl1P land covered was in litiga-
tion and that a decision b~· a court might adversely af-
f Pct that tith~. The memorandum of understanding speci-
fi<'all~r repudiated this 1958 contract but the court never 
determined the validitv of the contract or the ownership 
of tlw propPrty covPred by its terms. 
rrhP third stage presents the hearings of August 29, 
J %!! and SPptPmher 15, 1959. These hearings saw the 
coJlsolldation of the J1~state l\f atter and the civil action 
l'<'Sulting in the judgment of October 2, 1959 entitled civil 
aetion -t-784 and probate matter 2655. The settlement of 
::in atcount in the Estate Matter had been set for August 
29 and argument on the amended motion was on the 
ealendar for the same date. (R 4784 24: R2 2655 
3: rrr. Aug. 29 1). The motion was to compel 
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deliver~· of property aceording to the memorandmn of 
understanding and not for trial of disputed issues as 
mentioned in the statement of f'Ounsel (Tr. ~\pr. 1 
1. 2) .. \t the ~.\np:ust 20 hearing, the intervener appeared 
because it had !ward of the repudiation of the October 
contraet ( Exh. ~) ,,-ith the )fother, hut efforts to ohtain 
a copy of the me1110ranclulll had heen unrewarding. The 
inte1Tener appPan•fl as a party in all subsequent prohatf:l 
matters i Tr. ~ept. 15 :13 .. )(i: R3 2(i55 4-36). 
This stage was initiated h~- the opening statement of 
c-ounsel for the Dau~hters. He represented to the court 
that conversations had taken place between the parties 
in an attempt to reaeh an understanding. The effort was 
to no avail, and for this reason the Daughters felt it 
necessary to bring tlw matter hefore the court to compel 
their l\f other to transfer the separate property to the 
Estate pursuant to their interpretation of the terms of 
the memorandum of understanding <Tr. ~\ug. ~9 
1,2). In response, counsel for the )fother stated that 
the property was to he de posit Pd with \Yalker Bank & 
Trust Co.! simpl~- as f'Ustodian: and in order to protect 
her, no other arrangement should be required until agree-
ment had been reached and the trust formalized (Tr. 
Aug. 29 +). 
Following the statements by counsel, the )[other 
took the stand as a witness and was interrogated as to 
items of personal property, the expenditures of money, 
and the sales or purported sales of property. The in-
quiry into expenditures "·as detailed, covering all items 
from payment of tithing to repairs on the lawn mower 
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(Tr. Sept. 15 62-96). The matter was then continued 
to Sept0mlwr 15, 1959 at which time the ~Iother again 
test ifiP<l. arnl except for one instance her testimony was 
limite<l to the subject matter of the August 29 hearing. 
Thr l'X('<'ption was her testimony relating the discussions 
with hN daughter, Betty Hayward, about the formation 
of a t rnst prior to the commencement of civil action 4784 
(Tr. Sept. 15 72). 
_.\ t tlH-' ('on cl usion of the September 15 hearing, the 
('Ourt announced its judgment, which was signed and 
enterc'd on October 2, 1959 in both cases (Tr. Sept. 15 
100-10:1). The judgment followed the language of the 
mPrn11r:rndum of understanding hut did not contain any 
orr1.n relating to the accounting, the sole subject matter 
lwfor(- the probate court. The judgment was subject to 
fnrtlwr order of the probate court and the acts of the 
parties in formulating the trust be be created (R 4784 
:19). 
The fourth stage details the efforts to prevent the 
premature distribution, the attempts to sell, and the re-
sollltion to distribute the property to the Daughters. It 
is mainly concerned with the February 1, 1960, hearing 
which was conducted as a probate matter. The admini-
strator had filed a petition requesting the court to con-
firm the sale of the separate property to the intervener 
( H~ ~G55 ~90). 1-'he petition asked that the sale be 
eonfirmed at $15.50 per acre. This price was agreed to 
between the administrator and the intervener and was 
raised from the $15.00 provided for in the agreement 
between the Mother and intervener (Exh. 3: R2 2655 
10 
290: rrr. Feb. 1 33). Tt was also brought to the 
attention of the ronrt that the intervener had paid 
$10,000.00 on the purchase price at thP time of its exer11 _ 
tion (rrr. Feb. 1 11-13; R2 2G5:5 406). 
ThP Daughters prntest('d this petition (R2 2G55 
318) and petitioned the court to distribute to them all 
the property (R 2fi55 300). They, like the administra-
tor, wanted to st>lJ but with one important difference. 
Their petition asked the court to distribute the property 
to them subject to the payment to the Estate for deposit 
in the trust tn be created of an amount equal to $15.50 
per acre, but leaving the propert>r so they could deal with 
it outside the probate court (R2 2655 300; Tr 
Feb. 1 1-62). 
At one stage m the proceedings, the attorney for 
the administrator advised the court that the Mother was 
present and, though not represented by counsel, had re-
quested him, as a favor, to state to the court that she 
would like to protest the petition to distribute all of the 
properties to her Daughters (Tr. Feb .. 1 9). She took 
the witness stand, and upon the examination by the court, 
testified that she had deposited the property with the 
administrator for the purpose of expediting the forma-
tion of the trust, and that she could not permit the 
distribution of any property until the provisions of the 
memorandum had been completed (Tr. Feb. 1 17-18). 
Nothing further \Vas heard with respect to the objection 
and protest of the Mother, and the court proceeded to 
hear further testimony on the petitions for sale and 
distribution ('Tr. Feb. 1 40). 
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rl'Jw tPstimony pn·sented did not relate to the owner-
slii p of pro1wrt~' nor was there any inquir~- about the 
existenr·e of a trust. The hearing was confined to the 
d<~tai Is of an areonnting and Ow possibilities of the sale 
of all ti!(' real property. The parcels of Mountain Ground 
im·lndPd as estate property ·were originally appraised at 
$8.00 per aere and the :'.\fother testified that one J. \Val-
la<'e \Vinrh (Tr. Feb. 1 19), through eounsel for the 
<l:rngliters. lrn<l attempted to purchase the Mountain 
Gronnd inclnded in the estate and separate property for 
$8.00 per arre, prior to the contract with the intervener 
(Tr. FC'b. 1 19). Arron Hanson, testifying for the 
intC'n·ener, bid $15.50 per acre for all the Mountain 
(1 round. He also advised the court that an action to 
prnted tlw inkrvener's rights under the contract of 
Ortoher, 1958, had been commenced in Sevier County. 
Notwithstanding this offer to purchase, Mr. Hanson 
testified that he was not relinquishing the intervener's 
rights nrnler the contract (Tr. Feb. 1 45). The 
Mother lrnd tPstified that she intended to abide by her 
agTeement with intervener (Tr. Feb. 1 23). 
ln addition to the land, there were 1,870 grazing 
permit:;; that belonged to the Mother at the time of the 
<l('a th of her lrnshand. She had sold these to the inter-
vener and the Bureau of Land Management had au-
t horizt>d the tram;fer err. Feb. 1 26). The intervener 
confirmed the purchase at $10.00 a head for the 1,870 
grazing permits, the price he had agreed to pay by the 
<•.ontract with the Mother. At this point in the hearing, a 
per~on in the court room (later identified as Mr. J. Wal-
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lace \Vinch) offered to make a bid in excess of the one 
before the court (Tr. Feb. 1 54) and the court re-
cessed for lunch to permit tlw presentation of a written 
bid. 
Following the noon recess, the court announced that 
it had received a written offer by J. \Vallace \Vinch to 
purcha~w the prop<•rty for $17 .50 per acre ( R2 2655 
327: Tr. Feb. 1 58). The intervener then offered 
to purchase the property for $18.00 per acre and $10.00 
per head for grazing rights (Tr. Feb. 1 60). These 
offers caused considerable argument and counsel for the 
Daughters stated: 
"MR. NIELSEN : Now our bid, when I say 
ours, Mr. Winch's bid, and I helped him prepare 
it, Mr. Winch's bid is in excess by ten per cent the 
amount which Mr. Hanson had bid and I submit 
under the provision of the statute that the bid 
should be confirm ed.• • • 
THE COURT: Your petition, is that the en-
tire interest be set over to the girls, is that 
correct? 
MR. NIELSEN : That is the petition, • 
(Tr. Feb. 1 61-62). 
. .,, 
Following the argument the court-at the suggestion 
of "a gentleman in the audience"-took a further recess. 
When the court reconvened, it stated that it had made up 
its mind and thereupon denied the petition for sale and 
granted the petition for distribution to the Daughters. 
On February 29, 1960, present counsel appeared on 
behalf of the Mother (R2 2655 336). Further peti-
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tion:-; and order~ to show cause were filed by the 
Danµ;ht(~r:-:, and objections to the distributions and orders 
wt-rP filed on Lehalf of the Mother and the intervener 
( H2 2fi;)5 360-:·rnl, 361. b). The minute entries rela-
ting to thP hearings note their protests to any further 
distributions, which entries are the only record--except 
pleadings--rnade of the objections to the orders to show 
<·auf'c and petition for distribution (R2 2655 356). 
On October 13, 1960 the court signed two separate 
<lec·rePf:. One decree distributed to the Daughters a 2/3 
interest in all real property, both separate and estate, 
not theretofore distributed (R3 2655 436-440). The 
other decree distributed to the Daughters a 2/3 interest 
in J .870 Taylor Grazing Permits previously owned by 
decedent (RH 2655 445), but which permits had there-
tofore been transferred by the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment to the Mother and later to the intervener (Tr. Feb. 
1 26, 30, 28, 47, 50, 51). 
8T ATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE DECREES OF DISTRIBUTION ARE VOID FOR 
WANT OF JURISDICTION. 
POINT II 
THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING W 1..S IN-
RUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT. 
POINT III 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE AND THEY AFFIRMATIVELY SHOW 
THAT APPELLANT WAS WRONGFULLY DENIED THE 
RIGHT TO DEFEND HER PROPERTY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
'THE DECREES OF DISTRIBUTION ARE VOID FOR 
WANT OF JURISDICTION. 
Tlw jurisdiction of the probate court over property 
is acquired by the death of a person having title to pro-
perty or obtaining title thereto by one of the statutory 
procedures' available to heirs, executors, and admini-
strators. \Vhere there is no jurisdiction because there is 
no title or ri~ht to possession, any order or decree of the 
probate court affecting such property is void. In this 
case, title to the separate property was not in the de-
ceased at the time of his death and has never heen ae-
quired by the Daughters or the administrator, and the 
decrees of distribution affecting the separate property 
are void. 
The jurisdictional distinctions an<l procedural re-
quirements relating to probate matters and civil actions 
are clouded in the case presented by this appeal. This was 
accomplished by the method of calling up the civil case 
on a motion at the same time an estate matter was set on 
the probate calendar. Notwithstanding this, the exercise 
of jurisdiction by the court in its judgment of October 2, 
1959 is an issue. 
1Sec. 75-1·2 (Where wills proved and f~ granted) Utah Code Anno· 
tated 1953. 
Sec. 75-4-5 (Succession in absence of will) Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
Sec. 75-11-5 (Actions to recover personal property) Utah Code Annotated 
1953. 
Sec. 75-11-3 (Right of possession) Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
F('(1n1 t liP ti111e title to the pro pert:· lweanw a legal 
i-.;:--·11<· i11 1 >dolH'r_. I ~l;J/. tl1P Da11ghtPr:-: have att<•111pted on 
1Lr1·1· "l'•'<lc'l()ll" to a1·11uin• titl<' to tl1P s<•paratP prop(jrt~'· 
Tl1ci1· fir.'d at11•1upt \\'<Is tl1<• petition to rrmove the Mother 
;1:-: ;1dt11in1strn1ri:-; 1tpo11 tl1f· cl<tilll that sh<> was \\TOJHTfullY 
~ . 
\\it lilwlding- pos:-wssion or prnpert:· belonging- to the 
I•:> tat<:· ( H 1 21i5G 29). 'J1he petition dated September 
:..>::. l '.l:-J/ set forth the procedure of Seetio11 75-11-18, Utah 
Code .\ nnotated 195:3: 
··Citation to pPrso11 snsp<>ded - Order to 
rl'tnrn.-The (·ourt rna:· n·quire anr person sus-
}H'ded of Jiaving taken wrongful possession of 
an:· of tlw effects of the <le<'edent or of having 
lu1<l sueh e ffeets under his control, to appear and 
:-:1iln11it to an examination under oath touching 
:-:Heh nu,ttkrs; and if on sueh examination it 
ap1i.~ars that he has wrongful possession of any 
such propert:•, not adversely claimed, the court 
may order the delivery of the same to the execu-
tor or a(hninistrator of tht> f'Rtate." 
In tlit> hem·ing on the pdition on October 21, 1957, 
thP ]lotlicr was 0xamim•d eoncerning the property 
claimed l(J lw \\Tongfnll.'· withhel<l. Aftt>r hearing the 
PYidt>JH'(' and apparPntly being full:· advised, the court 
e11lc1<•11 it~ order date(l Odoher 28, 1957 permitting the 
"Jlotl1Pr to \\·it lid nm· as administratrix but did not make 
an:· finding or order relating to the daim that she was 
\rithholding JH'OJWl't\. fo making tlw order of October 
2~. tfo• eou rt wa8 proceeding under a statutory provision 
giving it jurisdidion to determine whether there was 
a \\ 1011gf1tl \\·ithltolding of property belonging to the 
16 
:E~state. The statute ah;o gave it authority to order 
delivery of property it determined belonged in the Estate. 
In this proceeding, the court had before it all the heirs 
and the administrator, which persons constituted all the 
necessary and proper parties to exercise its jurisdiction. 
The issue was presented to the court and it must be 
concluded that its failure to compel the delivery of the 
property by its order of October 28, 1957 constituted a 
determination of the facts (Rl 2655 86). 'The factual 
situation relating to the title was not pleaded again in 
the probate court. The court determined that the estate 
did not have the right to compel delivery and subject 
the separate property to the administration of the Estate, 
and its decrees of distribution of October 13, 1960 are 
void. 37 \Vords and Phrase::; at page 698, 699: 
"Order in proceeding between executor and 
an individual concerning securities was 'res 
judicata' in individual's proceeding against 
estate. In Re Stahl's Estate, 27 N.E. 2d 662, 305 
Ill. App. 517." 
"A probate court's order in favor of execu-
tor in proceeding between one of deceased's execu-
tors and an individual concerning individual's 
claim to an interest in securities belonging to 
deceased's estate to establish ownership of interest 
in securities by reason of alleged gift causa mortis 
by deceased, where order was a final determina-
tion of ownership of securities and no appeal was 
taken therefrom. In Re Stahl's Estate, 27 N.E. 
2d 662, 668, 305 Ill. App. 517." Also see In Re 
Spi~wsa's, Estate, 255 P. 2d 843. 
Following the proceedings terminating in the order 
17 
of Octolwr :2S, 19fi7, the Daughters commenced civil 
adion 478+ in the same court. The complaint contained 
tlw same allegations and was pursuant to the same 
statntor~' authorit~· as tlw petition of 8eptember 23, 
1957 in tlw probate court. However, there was no ref-
(·n~1wP to the order of October 28, 1957. The findings 
of fad supporting the judgment of October 2, 1959 are 
(\Onsistent with the testimony of the prior hearing in 
th(• probate ('Ourt in that title was found to be in the 
Motlu'r (R 4784 33). The judgment, however, is incon-
sistf'nt with the prohatP proceedings in that it ordered 
the separate property deeded to the administrator sub-
j0d to the administration of the I~state and to the cre-
ation of a trust. (R 4784 39). 
In entering its judgment of October 2nd, the court 
was cteciding matters previously determined by and 
within the jurisdiction of the probate court. The same 
rr>snlt must follow with rPference to the decrees of 
October 13, 1960. There was no plrading, subsequent 
to October 21, 1957, filed in the Estate Matter which 
plaeed the title of the separate property before the court 
for tletermination. In entering its decrees of distribution 
of October 13, the court was bound by the determination 
of fads made as a result of the order of October 28, 
1957. 
The jurisdiction of the court in entering its judg-
nwnt of October 2, 1959 is questionable on other grounds. 
lf the probate court attempted to try title within the 
framework of the probate procedure or distribute prop-
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erty over whi(·h it did not lrnv<• jnrisdi<'tion, the eomt 
exceedecl it~ ;jnris<lidion. Tf the jurisdidion of the court 
was invoked to qui0t title hut it ordered a conve_vanee 
suhjed to prolonp;ell supervi::.;ion of the court, it either 
failed to exereisp or exreeded its jurisdiction. In He 
Rice's EstatP, 111 l7tal1 --1-28, 182 Pac. 2rl 111, set forth 
two important requirements of the district court's ('ivil 
and probate functions: 
• '* '~ '~ The divisions of the court can he liken-
ed to hn) arms. The probate arm and the civil 
arm. For orderly procedure, it should use the 
most appropriate, but it has the right to use 
either. To give it this right there are two im-
portant requirements: (1) Have the necessary 
parties been given the proper notice as required 
by the statutes for the particular relief sought; 
and (2) are the procedural requirements of the 
proper code being complied with~ If these stand-
ards are met, then the court can determine which 
is the appropriate arm but it cannot refuse the 
use of either." 
While the court defined the district court as a court 
of general jurisdiction which could sit as a probate 
court and at the same time exercise civil jurisdiction, it 
reaffirmed basic principles enunciated in prior cases. 
Hampshire vs. Woolley, 72 Utah 106, 269 Pac. 135 : 
"A person's rights and the relief which he 
may be entitled to are based upon and measured 
by the established rules of law and procedure. 
The court may have jurisdiction over the sub-
ject-matter and of the parties, and still the judg-
ment or decree be void, because the procedure 
employed by the court was such that the court 
was not authorized to exert its power in that 
way." 
rl'o the saine effect is tlw holding in Ill Re Roger's 
};stole, 76 fltah :290; 284 Pac. 992, where there was no 
proof ol' perfonnanee under a eontract: 
.. rl'hPn• is no finding of any fact which will 
support a judgment that Cornelius West has 
eomplied ·with his contract. Under such circum-
stan('<~s the probate court was without jurisdiction 
to direct Katie S. Rogers to execute a deed to 
Cornelius "\Vest. To invoke the Ju.r.-isdvction o.f 
the r·o11rt there nwst lJr appropriate pleadings." 
Ttalies added. 
'I'he judgment of Octolwr 2, 1959 was not the result 
of thP observance of the procedural requirements set 
forth h~Y this eourt. The allegations and prayer were 
lmsPd on the same statutory authority as the petition 
to n~voke letters of administration in thP Estate :Matter. 
\Vlten the two causes were consolidated for hearing, the 
procedure was entirely prohate, the same as utilized in 
the usual settling of an account. The consolidation offered 
no opportunity for the assertion or trial of an adversary 
matter. No evidence was taken to establish title to 
property and questions of law raised hy the pleadings 
were not decided. The judgment confirmed title in the 
Mother by ordering her to convey it to the administrator 
by warranty deed. The absence of procedural require-
ments is illustrated by the remarks of the Court at the 
eonclusion of the September 15, 1959 hearing (Tr Sept 
15 l00-101): 
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''THE CO UHT: \Vell I believe, Gentlemen 
that I have arrived in this matter. It is m; 
opinion that the construction of this agreement 
Plaintiff's l~xhibit 1, provides the key to a deter~ 
mination of this case. In Paragraph 12 it seems 
to me entitled to, and I so hold, is entitled to the 
construction that the Mrs. Voorhees is entitled 
to make an accounting of her administration of 
the Estate and also of those items that she claimed 
to be her o-wn such as she has made this case. 
Otherwise it would seem to be that she would be 
deprived of the benefits which the contract gives 
her a.s is provided in Paragraph 1 of this con-
tract. Although the life insurance policy, not 
the life insurance, the health and accident policy 
is not mentioned specifically and although the 
testimony is that it was, it named Mrs. Voorhees 
as the beneficiary, I conclude that under the terms 
of the contract that the court should and the 
court does include that as a part of the Estate 
to be accounted for." 
It can only be concluded that the judgment of October 
2, 1959 is void because the court either did not have 
jurisdiction or it rendered a judgment in excess of its 
jurisdiction. The judgment and decrees of distribution 
have left the Estate in a serious condition. The court 
is required to supervise the formation of the trust, in-
cluding the designation of a trustee; then it must direct 
the trans£ er of the property to the trustee; then, if the 
property is sold by the Daughters, it must decide the 
value of "other assets"-if the money is spent before 
the trustee is designated-and then upon the successful 
completion of these tasks, entertain a petition by the 
administrator for final distribution and discharge. 
POINT II 
THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WAS IN· 
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE .JUDGMENT. 
11 1! <> f'Oll rt 's <'onstruction of the memorandum of 
nnderstanding "'hPn it <:>ntered its judgment of October 
'.2, 1959 is not cl<:>ar. lt could be one of four things; a 
f'ontrnet, a deel:uation of trm;t, a stipulation, or nothing. 
It i::-; hard to (•onceivc it as a contract hecause it does 
not state a (•onsirlPration; it does not d(-lscribe the prop-
Prty; it says that it is an agreement to agree on the 
<'r(-la t ion of a trust, and it is eornpletely aleatory. It 
cannot be a memorandum of an oral agreement because 
it sw~eifically i'ltatc8 there is no agreement on the mate-
rial provisions. 1 Corbin on Contracts, Sec. 107 at page 
3~(): 
"ft has already been shown, and it will appear 
at HHlll~' plaee8 in this treatise, that a 'meeting 
of the minds' is not an unvarying prerequisite 
to an enforceable contract. But if it is made clear 
that tlwre has in fact been no such 'meeting of 
the minds,' the eonrt will not hold a party bound 
b~, a <'<mtract varying from his own understand-
ing- unless his words and conduct were such that 
he had rem;on to know that the other party would 
he and was in fact misled." 
l t cannot be a declaration of a trust, it does not 
name a trm;tee or even provide for one; it does not 
<lescrihe the trust res; there was no transfer or delivery 
of prop\•rty, and it leaves all of the terms to be agreed 
upon. l n addition, the judgment specifically states that 
tlH~ trust is to be rreated. Tf it were considered a contract 
.,., 
to create a tr11st, a jndg111<>nt of :-;peeiiie pcrforniani·e 
would be fatall.'' <ldechve. 1 S('{)t/ 011 Tnrsts, Sec. :iO.l 
at page 228: 
''Hpecifie enforcement. Although a tru:-;t is 
specifically enforceable at the suit of the bene-
fieiary, even though the trust was gratuitously 
created, there is a question whether a contract 
to create a trust is specifically enforceable, even 
though it is binding as a contract and an action 
at law for damages would lie for failure to per-
form it. Although the promise to create a trust 
i~ under seal and is binding as a contract in juris-
dictions in whieh promises under seal are still 
binding, yet it would seem that it is not speci-
fically enforceable if no consideration was given. 
The rule that a gratuitous promise under seal 
is not specifically enforceable is well settled. In 
such a case the maxim that equity will not aid 
a volunteer is applicable. It would seem that the 
rule is applicable where the promise is a promise 
to create a trust." 
Furthermore, it says it is a stipulation and not a 
declaration or contract to create a trrn;t. 
It cannot be a stipulation. rrhe only resemblance 
to that type of document is that it said it was a stip-
ulation. Counsel for the DaughtPrs at the hearing on 
August 29, 1959 statPd there was complete disagreement. 
so the memorandum couldn't be a stipulation (Tr. Aug. 
29, 1, 2). 
\'lhat the memorandum is can only be determined 
bv the construction the court gave it at the time it 
e~tered the judgment of Oetoher 2, 1959. It is apparent 
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frolll tl1e n·<·nrd tliat the (•ourt ba~;ed its ·F'indings of 
1<'8d and ( ~onrlm;ions of Law entirely on the memor-
andt1111. 'l'li1s l<>a<ls to the eonclnsion that the court con-
s1d1'l'Pd tilt~ rn<•111ornrnhrn1 as a stipulation of the parties 
<·nnsentinµ: to the e>ntry· of tlw judgment. This was error 
IH•<·anse the <·ourt was required to interpret and construe 
the lang-uag-e of tliP memorandum and to supply material 
terms to make it a (•om1wtent stipulation. 
The general rule is well expressed m 30A Am Ju,r 
( .f urlqme11ts), Sec. 145 at pa.qc 254: 
· 'lt is not essential that a stipulation or 
<'ornsent for the entry of judgment be in any par-
lieular form, except as statutes or rules of court 
may otherwise require. It should clearly imdicate 
llu,, fact of aqrecnient and the judgment agreed 
upon, and the judgment should follow the stip-
ulation or agreement. As a general rule, a judg-
ment to the rendition of which the parties have 
agreed should show on its face that it was entered 
hy consent, but such a showing is not indispen-
sable, and the fact may be established by other 
evidence." (Italics added.) 
Counsel for the Daughters stated to the court at 
the August 29 hearing that agreement by the parties 
was impossihlt~ ('l'r Ang 29 1 ). He offered the mem-
orarnlum a~ plaintiff's ~xhihit 1. Counsel for the Mother 
objected to its admission nnless it was premised on the 
proposition that any transfer of property was merely 
a deposit with the administrator preliminary to final 
ag-reement under the memorandum. The Mother's posi-
tion was set forth by tlw following statement by counsel: 
""" * • it is the position of Mrs. Voorhees 
that in order to protect her under the stipulation 
that she should not be required to make these 
transfers until the trust is created." (Tr Aug 
29 95). 
In addition to its formal requirements, the courts 
have characterized a stipulation as a contract; and when 
its· validity is brought into question, it is subject to all 
of the tests of a contract. 
The contraetnal nature of a stipulation i:--; stated in 
3 Freeman on Judgnients, Sec. 1350 at page 2773: 
"A consent judgment is undoubtedly con-
tractual in its nature and should be construed 
as though it were a contract. It is based wholly 
upon the agreement of the parties with respect 
to the matter in controversy in the action and 
involves no judicial inquiry into, or preliminary 
adjudication of, the facts or the law applicable 
thereto. The agreement or consent renders this 
unnecessary and improper. But nevertheless, and 
notwithstanding statements frequently made to 
the contrary, the judgment is obviously something 
more than a contract, being rather the result of 
a contract and its embodiment in a form which 
places it and the matters covered by it beyond 
further controversy." 
The California Court stated in Palmer vs. Ci'iy of 
Long Beach, 199 P. '2d 952 at page 957: 
"A stipulation is an agreement between coun-
sel respecting business before the court (Bouv. 
Law Diet., Rawle's Third Edition), and like any 
other agreement or contract, it is essential that 
the parties or their counsel agree to its terms." 
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'l 1l1e prov111<'t' of a stipulation is the elimination of 
proof rc·lating to factual matters. \Vhen a stipulation 
pnrports to <lrterrnine the law, it invades the functions 
of fop ronrt arnl thus has no binding effect hefore or 
after judgment. 50 ~1m .!11r (Stipulations) Sec 5, at 
poo <' G07 : 
"lt has frequently been stated as a general 
rule that the decision of questions of law must 
rest upon the court, uninfluenced by stipulations 
of the parties, and it is generally held, accord-
ingly, that stipulations as to what the law is are 
invalid and ineffective." 
A stipulation is a recital of facts upon which the 
parties agreed and the rourt can enter a judgment with-
out determining issues of law. If Findings of Fact are 
ma<le, the~· must he within the stipulated facts or those 
reasonably inferred from what is stated in the stipula-
tion. 3 Freeman on Judgments, Sec. 1348 at page 2771: 
"It is not essential that a stipulation or con-
sent be in any particular form or that it be made 
in open court, except as the statutes or rules of 
court may otherwise require. It should clearly 
indicate the fact of agreement and the judgment 
agreed upon, and the judgment should follow the 
stipulation or agreement. 
Rince the court's authority is limited by the 
consent or stipulation, if the agreement is not 
full enough to dispose of all the claims or rights 
in the subject matter, the court has no power 
to supplement or construe the agreement by the 
insertion of extraneous matter in the decree. Any 
failure of the stipulation to fully express the 
intention of the parties must be corrected by 
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appropriate action." Also see Rees vs. Archibald, 
6 Utah 2d 264, 311 Pac. 2d 788. 
The memorandum of understanding cannot support 
a judgment. It did not create any contractual rights or 
contain an agreenwnt of facts upon which a court could 
declare any rights. 
POINT III 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE NOT SUPPOR~ED BY 
THE EVIDENCE AND THEY AFFIRMATIVELY SHOW 
·THAT APPELLANT WAS WRONGFULLY DENIED THE 
RIGHT TO DEFEND HER PROPERTY. 
vVhen the court gave the memorandum of under-
standing the quality of evidence and entered the judg-
ment of Octoher ~' 1959, the l\Iother lost her right to 
def end her title. She consistently asserted her o\vner-
ship of the separate property and her ability to sustain 
this position is conclusively supported by the record. 
No other person came forward and submitted to 
examination nor was any documentary evidence intro-
duced questioning the title to the separate property. 
The warranty deeds naming the Mother grantee had 
heen introduced in the probate court at the time of the 
hearing on the petition to revoke letters of administra· 
tion (Rl 2655 29). The decrees of distribution did not 
refer to the October 2 judgment but were based entirely 
upon the memorandum of understanding. Finding of 
Fact number 7 provides as follows : 
"Heretofore on the 1st day of April, 1959, 
all of the heirs of said decedent entered into a 
written agreement which provides that all of the 
•}'"' _, 
pr11('eeds from tlw estate should be placed in 
t, us!. 'all net income therefrom to be paid to 
~l rs. Y oorhees not less than quarterly during 
IH·r !ifP an<l the balance upon her death to Betty 
llannnd and Beverlv Clvde.'" (R 2655 431). . . . 
'l'l1e ("Pllrt in making its Findings of Fact did not 
1·(•11sider the judgnwnt of Odoher 2, 1959 a valid source 
of titk. This is the eonrt's third distinct determination 
of titl0 to the separate property and illustrates the 
transformation of tlie memorandum of understanding 
from a stipulation so incomplete that counsel refused 
t(I fik it witl1 t11e court to an agreement possessing more 
int0grity tlian the judgment in the civil action. 
Sedion 75-12-5, Ftah Code Annotated 1953 provides 
that t!H•re must be a showing to the satisfaction of the 
eonrt that it is for the best interests of the beneficiaries 
of the estate, that there be a partial distribution of the 
f~stak TJw l'o1ut made a finding that it was for the 
best interest::; of the heirs to distribute a part of the 
E:-tate to the Daughters and that it would not interfere 
with tl1e administration of the Estate or the distribution 
llf' as.-;ets. Pnless tht> memorandum of understanding is 
t:o11siderPd to he a stipulation consenting to the partial 
distribution, there is nothing in the record to support 
this finding. T n arldition to this, the title to the property 
was in litigation and the distrihution pursuant to the 
111e11wrandum of understanding was impossible until a 
t rnste0 was appointed. The language of Finding number 
9 is ns follow:-; (R3 2655 432): 
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"The Court further finds that it is for the 
best interests of the heirs of said estate and will 
in no way interfere with the due administration 
of the estate or the distribution of the assets 
thereof to distribute to the said Beverly Clyde 
and Betty Hayward a two-third undivided inter-
est in the real property remaining in said estate 
and located in Sevier County, State of Utah, and 
sale of which has not heretofore been confirmed 
by this Court, and charging the distributive share 
of sai<l heirs with the appraised value of said 
property at the rate of $15.50 per acre on the 
basis of each whole acre received by said heirs 
in connection therewith." 
This finding is not supported by the record and 
justification is not simplified when the proceedings of 
February 1, 1960 are considered. In that hearing, the 
petition of the administrator to confirm the sale of thP 
real property to the intervener according to its contract 
with the Mother and the petition of the Daughters to 
distribute all of the real property to them, subject to a 
charge in favor of the trust to be created were before 
the court (R2 2655 290-300). The intervener had agreed 
with the administrator to pay $15.50 ( 50¢ above the 
contract price) per acre. Mr. Hanson for the intervener 
testified: 
''Q. Now you are willing to go through with the 
offer that you have made to the administrator, 
Walker Bank & Trust Company, for purchase 
of this property? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Which is to include the fifteen fifty per acre 
plus interest at four percent since October 
of 1958, the date that * * * 
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A. Y PS, sir." (Tr Feb 1 40). 
l•'ollcnYing this offer, the hi<l of Mr. Winch was pre-
:-:t•nted to tlw <"ourt h~, ronnsel for the Daughters in the 
a.11101111t of $17.:>0 ]>Pl' acre. The intervener then raised 
lii;.; hid to $1 ~.00 p<>r aere. Notwithstan<ling the bids, the 
··ou1 t d(•<·idPd against the sale of the property and ordered 
thP distribution of a ~/:) intc•rest in the property to the 
Da11ght<>rs. 
How <'ould it be for the best interests of all the 
l1eirs wlwn an offer to purchase was made at $18.00 an 
acre for property a ppraise<l at $15.00 an acre T This 
might he hPnefieial to the Daughters because they have 
a 1·pady-made private salt- at which a profit of $2.50 an 
acre eonld he realized. lt is no benefit to the Mother 
lieeause 1vhen the court refused to confirm the sale, she 
was requin•d to perform according to her contract with 
thL' int<-~rTener. 'fhis compelled her to contribute 50¢ 
per acre from her own funds to the trust to be created 
instead of getting $3.00 an acre for the property. This 
not onlv illustrates tht- complete lack of evidence to 
support the findings but it accentuates the proposition 
that the J\lother has bf'en denied a right to be heard. 
1 T pon the premise of these findings, the decrees of 
distribution cannot be sustained. If they are considered 
valid, it mu~t he on the ground that the Mother's attorney 
deliberately Rtipulated away her rights. The record does 
not hare thi~ out but, if it were so, she should not be 
deprived of her rights. Palmer vs. City of Long Beach, 
s11prn, at 958: 
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''ln view of an attorney's duty to his client 
it should not lightly Le m;sumed that he stipulated 
away hit-5 case. "' 'Ii' ~, :Stipulations must be given 
a reasonable con::struction with a view to giving 
effect to the intent of the partie::s and the language 
used will not be so construed as to give it the 
flffect of an admi8sion of a fact obviously intended 
to bl~ controverted, or the waiver of a right not 
plainly intended to he relinquished." 
rr1w significance of the manner in which the pro-
ceedings "-err ('onclucted was that the 1\1 otlwr was led 
to believe that her rights were being protected until the 
terms of the trust agreement were settled. Under the 
state of the record, it can onl~- be assumed that the 
Mother was wrongfully denied her rights. In such cases 
equity is quick to grant relief. In Re Rice's Estate, supra: 
'•Equity will relieve one seeking relief from 
the effect of a judgment or decree procured hy 
conduct of the successful party which prevents the 
injured party from appearing at the hearing or 
trial on the merits. Under the present state of 
the record, this court must assume the executrix 
knowingly and willfully made misrepresentations 
to the petitioner which prevented him from ap-
pearing at the hearing and obtaining the property 
that he claims should have been his. Predicated 
on these alleged fraudulent acts, petitioner was 
denied his day in court." 
The finding of the eonrt that the partial distribution 
was for the best interest of all the heirs raises further 
implications. The .i\Iother not only stands to suffer seri-
ous financial detriment, but the memorandum of under-
standing passes the title b~- wa~- of the decrees of dis-
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i rihut ion to tl1<> Daught<•rs without thP aid of any con-
sidt•rntion. [Tmler sueh cireumstanees and in light of the 
natural li<ln<'iar~· relationship existing, all of the events 
must he look0d nt with <'lose serutiny. [f it is found 
tltat the fl! otl1er has been deprived of her property 
\\'itlwut the right to lw heard and under conditions of 
1111 l'ai rnPss, t hP decre<>s of distribution must he vacated. 
This eourt lias held that where a fiduciary relationship 
Pxists hehn~0n the parties, the conduct of the party who 
prnfits 11m8t he viewed with care and any advantage 
gained must Jip fair and upon full and complete dis-
clol'nre. Arntt vs. To1nlinson, 9 Utah '2d 71, 337 Pac. '2d 
720: Child vs. C'lz ild, 8 [! tah 2d 261, 332 Pac. 2, 981. In 
C!hild vs. Cl1£ld, the effeet of an instrument under such 
cin·m118tanees was subjected to the following test: 
"When an attack is made upon the lower 
court's findings on the ground requiring an ap-
praisal of the weight of the evidence, this court 
is also confronted with difficulty as to what went 
on in the mind of the trial judge as to his belief 
of witm-'ssPs and finding facts. It is because of the 
sanctity with whieh the law regards written docu-
menb; that the rule has become well established 
in this jurisdiction that to find the deed had a 
purpose other than appeared on its face requires 
elear and convincing evidence." 
rrlw problem in this case is not only what the court 
considPrt>d in entering the decrees of distribution, but 
what was available in the record and what should have 
hcen mad(~ a subject of inquiry before property rights 
wen· determined. The controversy presented had its 
hPginning prior to the death of Hillard L. Voorhees. 
The Daughten; knew of tlw <leeds to their ~lother an<l 
wer(' aware of the deeds in th('il' favor ('rr Oct 21 58-59). 
They also knew that their fatlwr did not intend to leave 
the descent of his propPrt!' to such a d('vice as a \\~II 
(11 r Oct 21 39). 
After the death of their father, the Daughters sought 
advice as to tlH' best method to preserve the Estate 
their Motlwr had acquired by rea::;on of the death of 
her husband. rrhe daughter, Bett!", in a deposition stated: 
"Q. Do you know whose idea this trust was initi-
ally'? 
A. l believe that-now this is" I believe", I won't 
be quoted-I believe that Ed Clyde suggested 
to Beverly that it was a nice way of handling 
things for a widow because she had no wor-
ries. I think Beverly told my mother that. 
Q. Do you know when that conversation would 
have been? 
A. That would have been in June. 
Q. OH 
A. 1956." (Deposition of Betty Hayward in civil 
action 4784 Feb. 5, 1959 34.) 
This suggestion was followed by the Mother and a 
trust agreement was drafted so some of the burden of 
management could be assumed by others and relieve the 
Daughters of their concern. The trust agreement was 
not acceptable to the Daughters because it was not irrev-
ocable and the daughter, Betty Hayward, informed the 
Mother of their ~mspicions: 
''Q. Did you think that these items should be 
included in the estate 7 
.\. If hPr trust had been set up properly and 
like slH• promised to, then it was perfectly 
all right to let it go as it was. 
(~. In other words, if you got this property in 
an inevocahle trust, you didn't care what 
~·our mother did with it? 
A. rrhat is right. 
(~. She didn't have to include it in the estate? 
A. 'rhat is right. 
Q. But if she reneged on the trust, you wanted 
to get it in the estate--
A. Yes. 
Q. -so you could get at least part of it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But you would have taken all of it through 
the trusU 
A. Yes, sir." (Deposition of Betty Hayward civil 
action 4784 31). 
At the 11earing on Octolwr 21, 1957, the Mother had 
appeared before the C'ourt and testified about the cir-
cumstances of the dee<h; eonveying to her the separate 
property (Exh -!, 5, 6, and 7: Tr Oct 21 96-98). 
''Q. (By l\lr. Worsley) Where did you get these 
doemuents 4 through 7 and 13 T 
A. Mr. Y oorhees gave them to me. 
Q. And about what time was that, Mrs. Voor-
hees T 
A. Soon after they were made. 
Q. 'I1hat would be soon after the year 1940! 
A. Yes. 
Q. And can you tell us, would that be within 
a year do you think! 









\Vithin a day or so? 
* * * Objection by Mr. Nielsen. 
Mrs. Voorhees, after these documents Bx. 
hibits 4 through 7 and 13, as you say' were 
delivered to you by Mr. Voorhees,· where 
did they remain between that time and the 
time of his death f Do you know where they 
were? 
In my possession. 
And were they in a box? 
r:rhey were. 
vVas that a metal locked box? 
No. It didn't have a lock. It was in a metal 
box. 
Q. And where was that box kept during this 
period¥ 
A. Well, I kept it in various places. 
Q. And was it at any time in the same large 
safe in which Mr. Voorhees had other papers' 
A. You mean prior to his death? 
Q. Yes. 
A. No. 
Q. You kept it apart but within the home in 
Manti? 
A. That is right." 
The testimony of tlte Mother in the hearings on 
August 29 and February 15, 1959 about the deeds wa~ 
the same. She asserted her title to the property on 
every possible occasion. At the hearing on February 1. 
1960 she appean~d without counsel and asked the eonrt 
to protect her rights to the property. Her words were 
"I turned it to the administrator to be sold and tn 
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'''·twdit1• tfw fonning- of this trust and that is why I 
prob·st 11." ( 'l'r F<•h I IS). 
Kc•g-11rning "·itlt the ord(>r of October 28, 1957 reliev-
ing- t lie ~fotltPr of the duties of administration, red flags 
1ffrP \\';1vPd 011 eight oe<'asions that should have caused 
a probatP <'011rt to stop until the rights were determined. 
The lirst su<'h warning was thf' refusal to file the mem-
orarnlnm of nn<1Nstanding in the hearing on April 1, 
I ~J;:~l and tlit> incompletf'ness of the memorandum when 
submitted to the eourt as Exhibit 1 on August 29, 1959. 
Tl1Pn follows: the testimony of the Mother in the August 
irnd September 1959 hParings; the failure of the Daugh-
ters to f'.nme forward and testify in support of their 
<'laims; the admission in evidence of the deeds conveying 
tlw separate 1n·operty to the Mother (Exh 4, 5, 6, and 7); 
emrnsf~l for the Daughters' statement that agreement 
was impossible on August 29, 1959; the suit filed by the 
intPrvener claiming adversely as against the Estate; the 
Daughters' petition to have all the property distributed 
to thern; and finally the Mother's appearance without 
r·ounsl'l to protest the distribution in February, 1960. 
The derrees of distribution cannot stand in view 
of the disn'gard of the :Mother's rights. The title to 
the property has not been divested from her under a 
judicial proress where she has had the right to be heard 
and to have her rights determined according to the law 
as announced by this court. 
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CONCLUSION 
When a person submits himself to a court that the 
law may determine his rights, it is fundamental that lw 
be afforded his day in court. It is equally fundamental 
that his day in court includes the opportunity to present 
his claim or assert his defenses. Anything less than 
this makes the law a poor protector. The judgment and 
decrees should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRED H. EV ANS 
Attorney for Def enda•nl 
and Appelkimt. 
